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MR. RUEBNER: It is my pleasure to introduce Professor
Spanbauer, who chairs today. She will introduce the moderator.
MS. SPANBAUER: Thank you, Professor Ruebner. Professor
Donald Beschle of The John Marshall Law School will serve as
moderator for our afternoon panel. He teaches anti-trust, constitutional law, property and religion and the law. Before joining the
John Marshall faculty, he was associated with the New York Law
Firm of Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon. He received a
B.A. and J.D. degree from New York University. He has published
over a dozen law review articles, the most recent of which is entitled, You Have Got To Be Careful. This article will be forthcoming
in the North Carolina Law Review. His publications have been
cited not only by commentators, but also by the United States Supreme Court. I give you a colleague who I am proud to be associated with, Professor Donald Beschle.
MR. BESCHLE: I am going to keep this very short. I sort of
feel that moderators at these things should be judged largely like
baseball umpires, the best of them you hardly notice that they're
there. A law school has a very strong tendency to think that legal
issues are decided in a self-contained world of lawyers and judges.
Of course, that is not the case. When dealing with constitutional
issues, there is a tendency for gab. To term something is constitutionally permissible does not necessarily determine whether it is a
course that should be taken. And with those two caveats in mind,
we can begin with our second panel of the day.
Unlike the morning panel, most are not lawyers. Rather, they
bring a number of different perspectives. From empirical and
theoretical, insights from jurisprudence, to religion, sociology and
political science. And they bring to bear on the recurring and
agonizing question of whether it is not better that one man should
die so that the whole nation should not perish. Our format, as it
was this morning, is that each speaker will be given approximately
fifteen minutes to present his or her paper. Those who work in
constitutional law know there is an ongoing debate about the
meaning of words and how hard fixed they are. Dictionary meanings are very flexible. Amazingly, when we come to these conferences, even those who argue about the hard and fixed nature of
words, tend to be very flexible when interpreting the phrase fifteen
minutes. But we do have a long, long list of very distinguished
speakers. And, again, we do want to leave some time for colloquy
among the speakers and questions from the audience.
If I were to fully introduce each of our panelists, we would be
out of time. Having said that, I am sure that they will understand
if I just drastically shorten their backgrounds instead. I am sure
they would rather speak than be spoken of.
Starting at my immediate left and working down the podium,
we begin with Walter Berns, who is a university professor emeri-
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tus at Georgetown University and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Berns received his bachelor's degree
from the University of Iowa, his post-graduate degree from the
London School of Economics and received his doctorate from the
University of Chicago. He has taught at Yale, Cornell and the
University of Toronto in addition to Georgetown. He has been a
member of the National Council on Humanities and the Council of
Scholars in the Library of Congress.
In 1983 he was the alternate United States representative to
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. He is the
author of numerous books and articles. The most relevant for purposes of this conference is his 1979 work entitled For Capital Punishment.
To the left of Dr. Berns is Ms. Nancy Bothne. She is the Midwest Regional Director for Amnesty International, USA. She
works with staff and volunteer members developing strategies on
amnesty and human rights. She has lobbied cities and states and
the federal government on behalf of the civil liberties and civil
rights issues. She has a Master of Science in Communications
from Northwestern University.
To Ms. Bothne's left is William Bowers, who is a professor at
the College of Criminal Justice Northeastern University. He received his bachelor's degree from Washington and Lee University
and his doctorate in sociology at Columbia University. For the last
twenty-five years he has conducted extensive research and has
been published widely on the subject of capital punishment. Since
1990 he has been a principal investigator in the Capital Jury Project, which studies how capital jurors make sentencing decisions.
Early findings of that study were reported in the Fall 1995 symposium issue of the Indiana Law Journal, which was devoted to
that project. Those of you not familiar with the Capital Jury Project may want to take a look at this issue of the IndianaLaw Journal.
Next, as we move down the line, is Richard Dieter, Executive
Director of the Death Penalty Information Center. He received his
Bachelor of Science degree from Notre Dame, his M.S. from Ohio
State University and his law degree from Georgetown. He has
written and spoken on the death penalty issue for both professional and popular audiences. He has presented legislative testimony and prepared reports for the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights.
Next to Mr. Dieter is Dr. Richard Land, the President of the
Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention.
He received his bachelor's degree from Princeton, his Master's of
Theology at New Orleans Baptist Theologic Seminary and his
Ph.D. from Oxford University. In 1987 and '88, he was Administrative Assistant to the Governor of Texas on church, state and
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family values issues. He also served on the Governor's Welfare Reform Task Force. He has been published in scholarly and popular
journals. He is an ordained Southern Baptist minister who has
pastored churches in Texas and Louisiana.
Next is James Lund, Co-Director of the Office of Ministry of
Peace and Justice, which has an Archdiocese in Chicago. Mr.
Lund received his bachelor's degree from Holy Cross University,
and Master's in Theology at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School.
He is chairman of the Illinois Community Affairs Division, and
co-authored with Mary Highcamp Moving FaithInto Action.

At the end of the line there is Austin Sarat, Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science. He received his bachelor's degree from Providence College and his Master's and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin. Not satisfied with
that, he then went to law school and received his J.D. from Yale
University. He has an extensive list of books and articles. Much
of his work deals with the subject of the relationship of law and
violence, both actual and symbolic.
This should be an extremely interesting panel. So we should
get to it. I will turn the microphone over, literally, to Dr. Berns.
MR. BERNS: Thank you, Mr. Beschle. It's true I am not a
lawyer. I have a daughter who is a lawyer. And I come from
Washington. So almost all my friends are lawyers. But as I listened to Steve Bright this morning, I'm rather glad I am not a
lawyer. I am referring to the fact that he had some nasty things to
say about lawyers this morning. So be it.
Karl Marx was mistaken about many things, and somewhere
on the list of mistakes would be his statement to the effect that
mankind never poses a problem for itself until its solution is at
hand. He obviously never paid sufficient attention to the problem
of capital punishment, a problem long since posed but, as Carol
and Jordan Steiker remind us, one for which no solution is at
hand--or, for that matter, even in sight. Other countries have
solved it-so to speak-by abolishing it, but that is not likely to
happen here. Rather than abolishing it, last year the Congress
added to the list of federal offenses carrying the death penalty,
which met with the approval of the American people, an overwhelming majority of whom continue to favor capital punishment.
The opponents of the death penalty had reason to believe that
their cause was won, or was about to be won, when, in 1972, the
Supreme Court held that the manner in which death sentences
were being imposed by judges and juries-capriciously or discriminatorily-constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. But their hopes were dashed
four years later when the Court held that capital punishment is
not, under all circumstances, unconstitutional. Since then, about
400,000 murders have been committed in the United States, about
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5000 persons have been sentenced to death, and, at year's end
1994, 257 convicted murderers have in fact been executed, thirtyone of them during 1994. At the same time, 2890 prisoners were
under sentence of death, and, since the average time between sentencing and execution is slightly over ten years, they will remain
on death row for a long time. This delay is due, in part, to the inability of the Supreme Court to speak with one voice in any capital
case that comes before it.
Consider Walton v. Arizona. As one might expect, considering
the heinous character of Walton's offense, the jury convicted him of
first-degree murder. In a separate hearing before the trial judge
who, before passing sentence, was required by the Arizona statute
to weigh both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the State
argued that two aggravating circumstances were present. In mitigation, and again as one might expect, Walton presented a psychiatrist's testimony that he, Walton, had a long history of substance abuse "which impaired his judgment" and, another favorite,
that he "may have been sexually abused as a child." His counsel
also argued that Walton was only twenty years old. The judge
sentenced him to death, and Walton, of course, appealed. In due
course-actually, in undue course-the Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment.
I cite this case not because there is anything unusual about
it-in fact, it is typical of the capital cases coming to the Courtbut merely to illustrate the cacophony that issues from the Court
in a capital case. I read from the official report of the case:
"Justice White filed separate opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined... Justice
Scalia filed separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in
judgment... Justice Brennan filed dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Marshall joined... Justice Blackmun filed dissenting
opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
joined ... Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion." Divisions like
this are either the cause or a reflection of the situation reported in
the Steikers' paper.
Leaving aside the question of fairness or discrimination-that
is, whether blacks are more likely than whites to be sentenced to
death; of the 257 prisoners executed since 1976, 140 have been
white, 98 black, 17 Hispanic, and 2 "other"-the issue has to do
with the effectiveness, and ultimately the morality, of capital
punishment. Its proponents believe that criminals should be made
to pay a price, the worst of them with their lives; the opponents
argue that capital punishment is immoral, inhuman, a denial of
human dignity, and, as a deterrent, no more effective than longterm prison sentences. Who is right?
On the deterrence issue, it is a question of whom or what to
believe, common sense or social science. According to common

The John MarshallLaw Review

[30:463

sense, executions not only punish the guilty in an appropriate
manner, but send a much-needed message to others, reminding
them of the price they will pay if they commit a capital crime. The
flaw in this argument is that, as things now stand in this country,
few criminals are apprehended, and fewer still convicted, and that
by the time a murderer is executed-ten plus years on average and
fifteen years in the case of the notorious Robert Alton Harris-his
crime has long since been forgotten. Everyone agrees that to be an
effective deterrent, punishment must not only be sure but swift,
and as now administered, it is neither.
This is especially true with capital punishment. As I mentioned, since 1976, about 400,000 murders have been committed in
the United States and 257 persons have been executed. If we
make the admittedly unlikely assumption that the number of
murderers is equal to the number of murders, this means that 99.9
percent of the murderers are not, or have not been, executed,
which is not much of a "message." Not surprisingly, therefore, the
typical social science study reveals that capital punishment is not
an effective deterrent of capital crimes, or, to be more precise, is no
more effective-or no less ineffective-than long-term prison sentences. In fact, of course, long-term prison sentences, even for
convicted murderers, are the exception rather than the rule.
But the social science methods used to prove the ineffectiveness of capital punishment are just as likely to prove the ineffectiveness of every other form of punishment, and no one believes
that-or, at least, no one is willing to draw the conclusion that
punishment in general serves no purpose and, like capital punishment, ought to be abolished.
On the moral issue, the proponents of capital punishment can
cite the Constitution and a good deal of impressive authority.
True, the Constitution forbids cruel and unusual punishment, but
it also contains five provisions: Article II, section 2 reprieves;
grand jury indictment in capital cases; double jeopardy; and the
two due process clauses, making it clear that its Framers did not
put the death penalty in that category. The proponents can also
call upon George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham
Lincoln who, albeit with a befitting reluctance, authorized the execution of 267 persons during his presidency; and the famous English liberal, John Stuart Mill; and that greatest of moralists, Immanuel Kant; and the first philosophers of natural right, Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau; and Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and, almost without exception, every other
political philosopher; and they can appeal to The Bible: Genesis
9:5-6; Leviticus 24:16-17; Numbers 35:31; and Matthew 18:6-7; and
even William Shakespeare. Against this formidable line-up, the
opponents can field a team of Cesare Beccaria, Arthur Koestler,
Albert Camus, various Freudians who contend that there is no act,
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even cold-blooded premeditated murder and dismemberment,
about which society may express moral outrage, and a few minor
leaguers in the Academy and ACLU.
Camus is the man to be reckoned with. Indeed, leaving aside
the question of whether it can be administered rationally or without invidious discrimination, the issue of capital punishment can
be said to depend on whose is the truer account of murder, Camus'
or Shakespeare's. What can a novelist or dramatic poet tell us
about crime and punishment? More, perhaps, than anyone else, if
he or she is a writer worthy of our consideration. In Macbeth,
Shakespeare shows us murder and its consequences in a world
governed by laws divine as well as human. The play is about ambition, murder, tyranny, and in response, horror, anger, vengeance, and, perhaps more than in any other of his plays, about justice. Macbeth had broken the most solemn, or as Shakespeare
would say, the most awful of the laws, and because of that, because
of justice, he had to die, not by his own hand-as he said, he will
not "play the Roman fool, and die on [his] own sword"-but at the
hand of the avenging Macduff. Yet, in spite of the horrors provoked in us readers by his crimes, he excites no anger in us, only
pity. He had deserved the respect of king, countrymen, army,
friends, and wife; and he lost it all. We pity him, but we also appreciate the anger of his countrymen and the dramatic necessity of
his death. The dramatic necessity would appear to rest on its
moral necessity. Was Shakespeare right about this? Lincoln
thought so. "Nothing equals Macbeth," he said. "It is wonderful."
Lincoln aside, would we be satisfied if Shakespeare, instead of
having Macbeth pay for his crimes with his life, had had him sentenced to prison? I doubt it. Most of us would think that Shakespeare got it right. Put us in that Scottish kingdom; put us in
Macduffs place-"All my pretty ones?/Did you say all?... What,
all my pretty chickens and their dam/At one fell swoop?"-and we,
too, would demand retribution, and feel justified when it is exacted. Most of us-the opinion polls confirm it-would also think
it right if Shakespeare were writing about our world; but here we
would have to contend with Camus. Our world, he writes, is a
world guided by no moral law, no truth or principle "that is superior to man," and, as a result, "has lost the only values that, in a
certain way, can justify capital punishment."
In his novel, L'Etranger,variously translated as The Stranger
or The Outsider,Camus shows us a world without God, as he puts
it, and one for which he, a hero of the French Resistance during
World War II, has great disdain. Except for the novel's leading
character-a man unable to love, hate, hope, care, admire, regret,
or grieve, and who never once frowns, smiles, or laughs-this
world is inhabited mostly by hypocrites, people who only pretend
to care for others and to be angry with the criminals who molest or
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kill them. Nevertheless, the novel is a modem masterpiece, and
Meursault, its antihero-for a world without anger can have no
heroes-is a murderer.
He is a murderer whose crime is excused, even as his lack of
hypocrisy is praised, because the universe, Camus tells us, is
"benignly indifferent" to how we live or what we do. There is no
basis in this world for friendship, for community, and, therefore,
no basis for the anger expressed when someone commits a crime,
even a murder. Of course, the law is not indifferent; under it,
Meursault is sentenced to death. But Camus the novelist tells us
that the law is simply a collection of arbitrary conceits.
It might occur to his readers that if the universe is truly indifferent to what we do, with the result that society is not justified in
disapproving of murder, then the members of that society, Camus
for example, are not entitled to disapprove of capital punishment.
But Camus anticipates that objection. He says there is one thing
that connects us one to another, a "solidarity against death," and a
judgment of capital punishment "upsets" that solidarity: the purpose of human life is to stay alive. The response to that, of course,
is why bother?
So what world do we inhabit: Shakespeare's or Camus', a
moral or amoral world? To be specific, are we truly--or do we
merely pretend to be-both saddened and outraged by the death of
twelve-year-old Polly Klaas? Whatever the answer, and whatever
the answer to the deterrence question, at least one thing is clear: if
the man who kidnapped and murdered her had been executed for
his previous crimes-he had twice been convicted of kidnappingPolly Klaas would be alive today. The same is true of Kara Kelley
Voss, a twenty-year-old newlywed, and her brother, Mark Kelley,
twenty-six, whose second child was four weeks old, who were
killed by Leo Jenkins, who had served time for burglary and theft.
Three days after he had walked into the Kelley family shop, intending to rob it in order to feed his drug habit, he was arrested
and confessed to the killings. Eight years later, with the rest of
the Kelley family looking on, he was executed. I read from the
press account:
"At 6:22 p.m., Friday [Feb. 9. 1996], Mrs. Kelley watched with
a steady gaze, anger and hate still pounding in her heart, as a lethal dose was pumped in Jenkins' veins. Surrounded by her husband, her remaining daughter, her daughter-in-law, and her husband's ninety-year-old mother, Kelley stared coldly at the gurney
where Jenkins lay, thinking of everything he had ruined, everything she had lost. It was so easy, she said afterward, to look on as
he died.... What she saw, she said, 'was immensely satisfying."'
Are we prepared to say she was a hypocrite? That she only
pretended to grieve, to be angry, to feel justified in seeing Jenkins
die? Are we-those of us who share her grief and her satisfaction,

1997]

A Philosophicaland Theological Perspective

who, in some small way feel that we, too, were victims of Jenkins'
crime-are we hypocrites? What sort of world do we inhabit? The
issue of capital punishment turns on the answer to that question.
Thank you.
MS. BOTHNE: My name is Nancy Bothne. I work as the
Midwestern regional director of Amnesty International. I find myself sitting here right now and feeling much the same way I think
that Bob Dole and President Bill Clinton felt last night. Do I respond to the previous answer, or do I go ahead with my remarks. I
think what I will do, for right now at least, is move ahead with my
remarks.
I would like to tell you a little bit about Amnesty International. What I am going to talk about this afternoon is how it is
that the death penalty, in and of itself, consists of an act of torture,
and that the death penalty is a violation of international standards
and universal human rights. I would like to talk just briefly about
what the experience of the death penalty is here in the United
States because I'm afraid this is a world which thinks if the United
States is a human rights leader, if anybody can get it right, well,
certainly we could. And I would also like to talk a little bit about
what is going on around the world, and what the trends are in exerting the death penalty.
Amnesty International, as you may all know, is a grass roots
movement of over a million people. We work on behalf of human
rights. We work to promote human rights. We work to identify
human rights violations and stop them. We also work on behalf of
individuals whose human rights have been violated. It's fair to say
that the members of Amnesty International, like many others who
oppose the death penalty, do care about Polly Klaas and do care
about Jeanine Nicarico. We fight, however, exercising the death
penalty because we believe it is an exercise of a form of torture. In
many ways Amnesty International is sort of a torture expert. We
were certainly one of the first organizations out there promoting
the human rights language and identifying acts of torture and
trying to move people to act against that torture.
We did not start out as an organization which was opposed to
the death penalty. That kind of came to us as we started thinking
about the work that we do. You know, it dawned on us that if we
felt that a woman who was being hung by her arms in order to sustain excruciating pain, if that act was an act of torture, then
hanging someone by their neck until they die is also a form of torture. Amnesty International believes that the application of 500
volts of electricity to somebody to get them to behave or get them
to alter their behavior in some way or just to do it for fun, we believe that is an act of torture.
So how could we not believe that the application of 2000 volts
into somebody's body until they die is not an act of torture? In the
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former Soviet Union, the USSR, we understood that the prison officials there administered truth serums and psychotropic drugs
and other forms of injections into people in order to get them to
change their behavior, to change their way of thinking, to change,
period. We believe that was an act of torture just as right now we
believe the use of lethal injection as a form of capital punishment
is a form of torture. No matter which way we look at this, the
death penalty is an exercise of torture.
People who are tortured experience excruciating pain and suffering. First, of course, we know there is a very long wait here in
the United States before the exercise of punishment for their behavior, as we determined, the death penalty, is carried out. In the
case of electrocution, what happens is that the organs get paralyzed in a person's body. And, of course, there are currents of electricity going through one body. And oftentimes flames shoot out
from a person's body. Asphyxiation is often what occurs in the gas
chambers as well as with lethal injections. And by hanging there is
also asphyxiation as well as a tearing of the spinal cord, which
contributes to the source of death.
The move in this country is to use lethal injection, which has
been declared to be a humane one. There have been at least
twenty-four instances where the documentation of the use of lethal
injection has basically been screwed up and has not been administered in the humane way in which its proponents have argued it
occurs. Just this past year, Thomas Smith was executed in Indiana. His execution by lethal injection took one hour and twenty
minutes. At first they were unable to find a suitable vein, so the
technician administered a local anesthetic and had to insert a
catheter into Tommy Smith's leg. Tommy Smith was conscious the
entire time. It was only after they finally were able to find the
vein, that they were able to then administer the dose of the lethal
drugs.
Why is it that you think we put a hood over somebody's head
when we execute them? There is a horror involved in killing
someone. And certainly the horror of the deaths of Polly Klaas and
others is something that we condemn. But we also condemn that
the deliberate use of the death penalty is a form of execution by a
government. The death penalty is a violation of human rights.
I would like to tell you just a little bit about where it is and
how it is that international instruments address the death penalty.
But I also want to sort of reflect a moment on why it is that we
have experienced such great celebration with the release of Dennis
Williams and Joe Burrows and Rolando Cruz and three other men
who have been released from death row here in Illinois this year
after the State finally acknowledged that they were innocent of the
crimes for which they had been convicted. We sponsored a reception for these guys. And, you know, they got up. And they talked
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to us in the crowd. They talked about what their experience was,
what it was like to be released.
I sat there and listened to them. I was terribly moved by
what they had to say. And so I asked myself why. They really
didn't do anything. They were unjustly locked up. But, you know,
somehow or another what it is they were saying was very moving.
I think it was moving because they survived.
They talked about their survival. And that survival, that very
survival is a celebration of life. We were there to say that life goes
on. They were there to say that there is a way of redeeming our
humanity by acknowledging what has happened here and by
sharing this story and by trying to make sure that this didn't happen again.
I think that that feeling, that notion of what our humanity is
and what life is and what it is we celebrate in one another is actually the basis for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(U.D.H.R.). The two underlying principles of that universal declaration, the U.D.H.R., are that people should be free from fear and
that people should be free from want. To be free from fear is a concept that is a pretty incredible concept. It deals not only with a
relationship of the state to individuals, but with individuals to individuals.
When we talk about the governmental role, however, when we
talk about how it is that we punish behaviors of members of our
society, we talk about the government's role, that is the government's relationship to individuals. The U.D.H.R. talks about a
right to life. And it is based on that principle, I think, that begins
to anticipate an abolition of the death penalty. The U.D.H.R. is a
political document. Certainly the United States has quite a heavy
hand in the language of it and in its adoption.
The U.D.H.R., however, is not the only international instrument which addresses issues of capital punishment. We also have
an international covenant of political rights. What that covenant
does is it starts to declare and formalize through the language,
which is adopted in sort of a treaty form, that there are circumstances in which exercise of the death penalty must not be allowed.
We will not execute pregnant women. We will not execute juveniles. And the countries which have signed on to that covenant,
which I believe number over 168, have indicated that they have
started to understand the argument, started to understand the international principle which says that the death penalty is violation
of human rights.
We then go on to protocols which have been created to amend
that international covenant. And one of them very much specifically seeks to abolish the death penalty. So for those countries who
have signed on to this standard of international human rights,
they agree to abide by that protocol. The standard is there for all
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to see. The standard in the international community is that the
death penalty must be abolished.
I am going to get back to what is going on in the international
community. But I just want to refresh ourselves a little bit about
the experience in the United States. In 1993, Amnesty International sponsored what we call a "Commission of Inquiry" into the
death penalty as a practice in the United States. Representatives
from around the world came to the United States to provide testimony about what it is that we're dealing with. And what these international legal scholars, human rights scholars and real folks
indicated is that the United States Constitution and the Bill of
Rights provided a model of civil and political rights which governments look to all around the world with only one exception: the use
and application of the death penalty in the United States.
Henry Schartzchild, who was with the American Civil Liberties Union but who recently passed away, in his testimony characterized this phenomenon which occurs in the United States as
something where we use homicide as an instrument to social policy. With the sanction of the Supreme Court, we in the United
States kill innocent people. We in the United States kill juveniles.
We in the United States, with the sanction of the United States
Supreme Court, kill mentally ill and mentally retarded people as a
form of punishment.
We know that the United States is more likely to exercise and
seek out the application of the death penalty if the victim is white
and the perpetrator is a person of color. We also have seen, certainly in our community, that there is a taint of politics which
comes into play as we figure out who it is that we are going to determine is subject to a capital case and who is not. This is not the
trend around the world, though. In the world today, one hundred
countries have abolished the use of the death penalty. Ninety-four
countries still retain use of the death penalty. But one-hundred
have abolished it.
I find it somewhat ironically amusing that when Trinidad and
Tobago abolished the use of the death penalty, they said it firmly.
They were so convinced by Furman that they decided they would
move within their country to abolish the death penalty. Europe itself is basically an abolitionist continent. When Croatia sought entry, and when other countries seek entry into the European
Council in Strasbourg, they do so under the condition that they
ratify the second option of the protocol, the death penalty. That is,
that they agree to abolish the death penalty and agree never to
seek its reinstitution.
When the International War Crime Tribunals in the former
Yugoslavia were convened, and those criminal courts are convened
in order to identify and punish the most egregious behaviors, they
are prohibited from seeking application of the death penalty as a
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form of punishment. There are countries around the world which
experience high crime rates like us in the United States. Brazil is
one example. All of those countries have abolished the death penalty.
Since I have a list of countries which have abolished the death
penalty since 1990, I don't want to belabor this. But we certainly
have found that Hungary, Ireland, countries all around the world
have abolished the death penalty. The trend in the world is away
from using the death penalty. And the United States is the world
leader, which is moving closer toward and expanding the death
penalty. My conclusion is that, well, the world is right.
The United States may need to understand and may need to
apply and may need to bring into its rhetoric what it is that is going on in the world at large, what it is that international human
rights standards are, and how it is that those human rights standards are being developed. I think if we do so and I think if we respond to some of the other factual information which our panelists
would be offering today, we will see as a country that the death
penalty should no longer used, as it is a form of torture. Thank
you.
MR. BOWERS: I want to begin with a statement of the principal conclusions of recent research I have conducted on the death
penalty in the United States. I have asked our chairman, Mr.
Beschle, to read this statement for me because I am visually impaired and I can't read it to you myself. It will serve as a overview
of points I am going to talk about in more detail. With your permission, why don't we begin this way.
MR. BESCHLE: I am reading now from Professor Bowers'
outline. It says I have researched capital punishment for the past
twenty-five years and found it to be an instrument of symbolic
boundary maintenance that fails the test of deterrence and cannot
be purged of racial and social class bias. Since the Supreme
Court's failure in the McCleskey decision to enforce the dictates of
Furman, I have turned my research attention to people's attitudes
toward capital punishment and their behavior as capital jurors
who are called upon to decide which murderers should die. My
remarks report the principal conclusions I have drawn from this
recent research.
First, deep-seated public support for capital punishment is an
illusion. The public would prefer an alternative to the death penalty that incorporates life without parole combined with restitution
to murder victim families. People recognize that the use of the
death penalty is too arbitrary, and that its application is racially
and economically biased. They place top priority on punishment
policy that requires offenders to work for restitution to their victims survivors as a missing element of criminal responsibility in
our punishment policy.
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Second, politicians and the media are propping up the illusion
of strong public support for capital punishment. Selective media
coverage of crime and punishment emphasizes the lurid offenses
and vengeful responses of murder victim survivors. Politicians
misread their constituents' punishment preferences.
They
wrongly imagine that advocating an alternative to capital punishment would hurt their re-election chances. Voters say they would
be more likely to vote for a candidate who advocates such an alternative.
Third, the public grossly underestimates the time convicted
first degree murderers usually spend in prison if not given the
death penalty. Most people strongly agree that such offenders will
be out of prison far too soon. Their estimates of the time such offenders will usually serve fall well below the mandatory minimum
for parole eligibility in their states. This misperception accounts
for some residual death penalty support.
Fourth, the illusion of early release of murderers not given
the death penalty is having the pernicious effect of causing people
who serve as capital jurors to vote for the death penalty quite
apart from the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors
supposed by law to guide their sentencing decisions.
Fifth, many capital jurors take a stand on what the defendant's punishment should be and even become absolutely convinced on the matter of punishment before the sentencing phase of
the trial begins, in violation of the constitutional precept that jurors' sentencing discretion must be guided at a separate sentencing phase of the bifurcated capital trial.
Six, many capital jurors misunderstand the judge's sentencing instructions in a way that tilts their decision-making in favor
of a death sentence. They typically fail to appreciate the altered
standards of proof and need for agreement among jurors that apply to mitigation as opposed to aggravation.
Seven, capital jurors deny personal moral responsibility for
the life or death sentencing decision they make. They see the law
or even the defendant himself as primarily responsible for his
punishment. They are reluctant to accept responsibility for the
dirty work that capital punishment entails.
Eight, Illinois is conspicuous by its absence from the Capital
Jury Project. I conclude with an invitation to your state to join our
ranks in this effort to understand how capital jurors make their
life or death sentencing decisions.
MR. BOWERS: Thank you Mr. Beschle. I will now fill in some
details of the research which has led me to these conclusions.
Please ask me whatever further questions you may have about this
research during the discussion period at the end of the session. So
let's begin.
Two projects, two sets of studies, are the bases for these con-

19971

A Philosophicaland Theological Perspective

clusions. One is a series of representative state-wide surveys I
conducted in New York and Nebraska in 1991, and in Kansas and
Massachusetts in 1994. The other is the work of the Capital Jury
Project, CJP for short, which is now underway in fifteen states. I'll
come back to the CJP later in my comments. The state-wide surveys were inspired by a study commissioned in Florida in 1985 by
Amnesty International that revealed a remarkable insight about
public attitudes toward the death penalty, best summarized perhaps in the aphorism, "public support for capital punishment is a
mile wide but only an inch deep."
Working with focus groups and a pilot survey of Florida citizens, the Amnesty-supported investigators found that if the public
could be sure that offenders would not get out of prison and would
do something meaningful for victims' survivors while in prison,
they would prefer this kind of punishment to the death penalty.
The Florida investigators fashioned a question that read "if convicted first degree murderers in this state could be sentenced to
life in prison with no chance of parole, and required to work in
prison industries for money that would go to the families of murder victims, would you prefer this as an alternative to the death
penalty." In response to this question, Florida citizens abandoned
the death penalty in droves. This same finding was subsequently
replicated in more than a half dozen other states. But these surveys hadn't revealed why people were so willing to abandon capital
punishment in favor of life without parole plus a requirement of
work for restitution. This is what I determined to find out with my
surveys in these four states.
We often hear the claim that about seventy to eighty percent
of the public want the death penalty. It is true that when you ask
people what I call "the standard death penalty polling question,"
which has been used over and over again in literally hundreds of
polls since 1936, seventy to eighty percent of the public now say
they "generally favor [rather than oppose] capital punishment for
first degree murderers." This was true in the four states I surveyed. When, however, we asked people about the alternative of
life without parole plus restitution, specifically whether they
would prefer the death penalty or this alternative for convicted
first degree murderers, the claim of overwhelming death penalty
support evaporated. Only nineteen percent of the people in New
York State stuck with the death penalty; in Nebraska it was
twenty-six percent; in Kansas, thirty percent; and in Massachusetts, twenty-three percent. In other words, while three out of four
people said they favored the death penalty, only one out of four
would stick with it if the alternative was life without parole plus
restitution. People will accept it because it expresses their fear
and anger about criminal violence, but they actually prefer the alternative.
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When we investigated why people preferred the alternative
we found two distinct reasons: one having to do with apprehension
about capital punishment and the other with attraction to the alternative. On the one hand, we found considerable misgivings
about the death penalty. People are aware that its application is
economically and racially biased, that its imposition is arbitrary.
For example, roughly four out of five people agree that "defendants
who can afford a good lawyer almost never get the death penalty."
About the same lopsided percentage agree that "the death penalty
is too arbitrary because some people are executed while others go
to prison for the very same crimes."
The other side of this is the attractiveness to people of the alternative that includes work for restitution, the idea that something more meaningful than killing the offender ought to be part of
our response to murder. And for many people that would be to
have murderers work for money that would go to their victims'
families or survivors. For instance, working eight hours a day for
thirty years at the minimum wage, an offender might make
$400,000, enough to pay for the education of a victim's children.
This suggests that we have come to think of criminal responsibility too narrowly. When we see it as simply a matter of
matching the defendant with the right crime, of establishing what
crime to charge and to prosecute, we are deciding what he is responsible for. But isn't there another side to criminal responsibility, the offender's responsibility to those he has victimized? His
crime has created a debt or obligation; it has caused injury and
suffering for which he is responsible. Shouldn't paying for his
crime mean making amends, providing reparations, doing recompense, seeking atonement? Shouldn't his punishment incorporate
this element of responsibility to his victims and impose on him the
obligation of repaying the debt his crime has created? The wisdom
of an offender's responsibility to his victims is unmistakable in
ancient law, as it is in our surveys of people's preference for a true
life sentence plus restitution over the death penalty.
In conjunction with the citizens surveys, in New York and
Massachusetts we also conducted surveys of state legislators.
Thus, in two states we could compare the punishment perceptions
and preferences of citizens and their elected representatives. We
asked legislators, as we had citizens, whether they would prefer
the death penalty or a true life sentence with a restitution requirement for convicted first degree murderers. Legislators were
considerably less receptive than their constituents to this death
penalty alternative. We then asked both citizens and legislators
what punishment they thought the other group would prefer.
Most legislators imagined that their constituents were unalterably
committed to the death penalty. They believed that it would hurt
their re-election chances if they came out for this death penalty al-
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ternative, while, for their part, citizens in these two states said
they would be more likely to vote for a legislative candidate who
advocated the alternative of life without parole plus restitution.
In a word, legislators are out of touch with their constituents'
receptivity to this death penalty alternative. Why, you may ask, is
there such pluralistic ignorance, such a gap between citizens'
punishment preferences and their legislators' perceptions of these
preferences? Well, I think the answer lies in an illusion of deepseated death penalty support perpetrated by pollsters' use of the
standard death penalty polling question and the wholesale adoption of this perspective in the media. While the polling data simply show widespread acceptance, the media embellished the polling results by speaking of "support" and applying adjectives such
as "strong," "firm," "deep-seated." In this way, the media has fostered an impression of unyielding public commitment to capital
punishment rooted in people's fear of criminal violence, and their
mistrust of the criminal justice system's ability to keep violent offenders off of the streets.
This brings me to the issue of early release, the fear of killers
getting out of prison to kill again. One questions we asked citizens
in these four states is how long a person convicted of first degree
murder will usually spend in prison before returning to society.
New York State had fifteen years before parole eligibility and
usually murderers were not out for twenty years. In Kansas, at
the time, it was a hard forty before parole eligibility. In both Nebraska and Massachusetts it was a life sentence without parole.
Most citizens, however, said the first degree murderer will be out
in less than ten years, in three of these four states. In Nebraska it
was fifteen years or less. Clearly there is a prevailing illusion of
early release. Citizens typically imagine that such offenders will
usually be out even before they become eligible for parole consideration. This exaggerated impression of early release is surely tied
up with the way the media handles crime and presents it to the
public. It must, I think, reflect the selective nature of media crime
coverage, especially the media's obsession with stories of murderers who kill again. No doubt, there is also a tendency for news
readers to blur the distinction between first and other degrees of
murder and even to think of murderers who were previously incarcerated as "released murderers" when, in fact, they were imprisoned for some other crime and hence, for example, "released robbers" prior to the murder they committed.
This issue of perceived early release provides a transition to
my other major research effort, the Capital Jury Project, a study of
what citizens think and do as capital jurors who must make the
life or death sentencing decision. This is a project we have underway with funding from the National Science Foundation. It began
with eight states, including those most prominent in the use of the
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death penalty such as Texas, Georgia, Florida, and California.
And it has since grown to include fifteen states. We are conducting interviews with 80 to 120 jurors drawn from twenty to thirty
capital cases in each state. The interviews last about three and a
half hours and are tape recorded, with the juror's permission. At
latest count, we have interviewed more than a thousand jurors
from 279 capital trials.
In every one of the ten states for which the CJP data are now
available for analysis, most jurors believe that defendants tried for
and convicted of capital murder but not sentenced to death would
usually be out of prison even before serving the mandatory minimum for parole eligibility in their state. That is to say, just as a
majority of citizens underestimate the punishment for first degree
murderers in every state we have examined, so too, a majority of
the jurors who have actually made the life or death sentencing decision underestimate the death penalty alternative in every CJP
state. What is more, the CJP data show that the more capital jurors underestimate the death penalty alternative, the more likely
they are to cast a final sentencing vote for death. The latest tabulation based on 962 jurors shows that of those who believe the alternative is usually less than ten years, seventy-one percent voted
for death, as compared to forty-four percent for death among those
who thought the defendant would usually be in prison for at least
twenty years. In effect, their punishment decisions are substantially a product of their mistaken notions of the alternative. Their
decision-making reflects the arbitrary influence of misperception
and misunderstanding.
We have also learned from the CJP data that, contrary to
judges' instructions, at least four out of ten capital jurors discuss
what the defendant's punishment should be during their guilt deliberations. Furthermore, perhaps in light of these discussions,
fully half of the jurors said they thought they knew what the punishment should be before the sentencing stage of the trial even began, and most of these premature decision-makers, specifically
three out of ten jurors in our sample, said they were "absolutely
convinced" about the punishment before the sentencing stage of
the trial. All this is, of course, before jurors were subjected to the
sentencing guidelines that the Supreme Court declared were what
distinguishes current capital statutes from those the Court ruled
unconstitutional in Furman. Well, I must skip ahead because time
is short.
On the final matter of who is responsible for the defendant's
punishment, let me tell you this much. We asked the jurors to
rank the following in order of responsibility for the defendant's
punishment: the defendant who committed the crime, the law that
provides for the punishment, the jury that makes the punishment
decision, the individual juror because the jury depends on the vote
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of each juror, or the judge who imposes the sentence. The jury as a
group or the individual juror were seen as most responsible by
only fifteen percent of the capital jurors. The defendant or the law
were ranked first in responsibility for the punishment by eight out
of ten jurors. To be sure, the convicted defendant is responsible for
the crime. That's what guilt means. I would add that he is also
responsible to the victim's survivors for the harm and injury he
has done them. And, the law surely does provide for the possibility
of death as punishment. Yet, responsibility for what the defendant's punishment will be lies first and foremost with the capital
jury. But the jurors wishfully transfer their responsibility to the
law or to the defendant himself. Apparently the decision-makers
do not want to take responsibility for their decisions. Should we
tolerate this?
In a concluding word, people want an alternative to the death
penalty but their law-makers don't realize it. So, they have laws
that provide for capital punishment and make them responsible
for deciding who should live or die, but they apply these laws before hearing the instructions, without understanding the instructions once they are given, and even acting on considerations they
are explicitly instructed not to consider. And, perhaps most troubling, they are unwilling, as capital jurors, to accept primary responsibility for the life or death decisions they make. I leave you
with these two critical questions. Is this morally tenable? Is it
constitutionally acceptable?
MR. DIETER: Good afternoon. I am going to present some
overhead projections. So we're going to bring down the screen and
darken the room. My approach on this subject is to deal with some
of the facts about the death penalty. We're here today to talk about
the theological and philosophical perspective on capital punishment. I think on this issue, as with many other issues, moral decisions are going to be made on the basis of where things are factually. What is the basis for our making this decision? There are
some issues like genocide, slavery, torture on which we do not
need to know the facts. We just say they're wrong. And it very
well may be that capital punishment is one of those things for
many people. But for others, they want to know who is it applied
to and how is it applied and what is the reasoning behind it. Finally, is it doing any good?
These are the questions which I would like to quickly address.
And by no means are we going to resolve these issues. These are
some of the fundamental questions that have come up in some of
the other speakers' remarks this morning. Hopefully, we will be
able to discuss them more and be able to do more research. The
first issue which I am going to look at is the question of deterrence.
Oddly enough, deterrence is not an issue which is primary anymore in the death penalty debate.
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Twenty years ago people in America were asked what their
primary justification for the death penalty was, among those that
supported it. And the majority said it is a deterrent to future
crime. That is no longer true. Only thirteen percent of the American public which supports the death penalty give deterrence as
their primary rationale. I think one of the basic reasons for that is
deterrence has not been proven. That's not to say it can't be proven
or that perhaps if executions were quicker or more frequent people
would react the same way.
The deterrent argument, however, just hasn't seemed to work.
Recently, there was a survey of the nation's top criminologists.
Eighty percent of the top criminologists in the country said that
the existing research on this issue does not show a justification for
the death penalty based on deterrence. What I show you here is
simply the results of the last twenty years.
You might note that the executions have been varying widely
year to year. Mostly they've been going up. And we expect that
trend to continue. The murder rate on the other hand has been
fairly stable, fairly flat, seemingly unaffected by the death penalty.
There is, however, some good news. This past year the murder rate has gone down. But it should be added that has been true
of most types of crimes. Almost every area of crime went down
last year, not just those punishable by the death penalty. Other
crimes not punishable by the death penalty have also been going
down. We'll see whether that trend continues.
As far as the question of deterrence, the past twenty years
has not been a convincing reason for supporting the death penalty.
I would like to turn quickly to the second issue, which is still very
hotly debated and relevant. That is the question of race. We heard
talk about the fact that there are actually more white people on
death row than blacks. And that's certainly true. I think the most
important research in the area of race and the death penalty has
to do with race of the victim. I thought if we graphically looked at
some of these issues, it might help explain what people are talking
about.
It turns out that in the United States today, if we look at victims of murders, about twenty-two thousand murders per year, the
victims are about evenly divided. About fifty percent of the victims
are black. Therefore, you might expect that in death penalty cases
about half of the cases would involve black victims. But that's nowhere near the case, as this chart shows. This is a breakdown of
who the victims are in the cases where executions have been carried out. Eighty-two percent have been white victim cases. And
this disparity has been supported by numerous studies.
David Baldus conducted such a study which was brought to
the Supreme Court. It has been widely accepted that there is a
much higher statistical likelihood that if you kill a white person in
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this country you will get the death penalty than if you kill a black
person. In the Baldus study, the numbers showed that if you kill a
white person you're about 4.3 times more likely to get the death
penalty than if you kill a black person. I believe this was referred
to this morning.
In other areas, we take that kind of correlation very seriously.
When it was discovered that people who smoke are 1.7 times more
likely to die of heart disease than those who don't smoke, that had
a great affect on our public policy. This is a 4.3 times greater likelihood. Something is going on. Something is wrong. Legislation
has been proposed in the U.S. Congress and in various states to
remedy this, to do something about this problem.
The basic response has been that if we adopt this legislation,
this "racial fairness" act, this "racial justice" act, then we will be
doing away with the death penalty. It will have the effect of stopping executions. It will stop the death penalty as we know it. So
that legislation has not been passed by the U.S. Senate and has
never been passed by a single state in the United States. A recent
example of how bad this situation is arose in the State of Kentucky. They had 1000 African-Americans killed, victims of murder,
in the State of Kentucky since the death penalty was reinstated.
There is not one person, zero percent, not one person on Kentucky's death row there for killing a black person.
If you look at the next chart, you can see also why the death
penalty is becoming an affront, an embarrassment regardless of
whether there might be reasons why we have such a racial difference. The death penalty is a slap in the face, I think, to the African-American community because of statistics like this. It shows
the difference since the death penalty was reinstated. If you take
white murders of black people, that's how many people have been
executed, four cases. If you look at black defendants who have
killed white victims, it's eighty-five cases.
There are various symbols which show or aggravate the divisiveness of racism in this country. When we discovered that Policeman Mark Fuhrman used the "N word," that became a focus of
the whole country's discussion of race. This is that kind of symbol.
It's symbolic and very divisive. Regardless of whether the death
penalty is theoretically justified, it is certainly a divisive issue on
the area of race.
I would like to go on to another issue again. I am not trying to
exhaust the discussion of these various issues. I just raise them to
illustrate what the numbers are. And that is the subject of innocence. That, too, has been referred to again and again as a disturbing aspect of the death penalty. This chart shows how often
innocent people have been released from death row in the past
twenty years.
I am not trying to show a pattern with this. Don't take any
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significance in the fact that it was eight one year and none another
year. Rather, this is just to show the overwhelming accumulation
of cases. Sixty-seven people who were wrongly convicted, who
could have been executed, many of whom were scheduled for execution, have been released. We list them here because they're out,
they're free. So they can tell their story. These are just numbers.
But the numbers begin to tell a certain pattern. And they begin to
tell a certain story themselves.
We have had 346 executions since the death penalty was reinstated. We have had sixty-seven people released. These are retrials where the people are acquitted or the charges are dropped,
where DNA evidence proved they were not involved with the
crime. These are not what some refer to as cases reversed on
technicalities, but what others refer to as violations of the Bill of
Rights. These are mostly cases of the wrong person convicted. So
for every five people executed, there is an innocent person who
remains and hopefully will be released from death row.
That's not to say that the chances of executing a person are
that great. I think it was referred to earlier that the chances of
executing an innocent person might be somewhere in the realm of
1 in 100. And that's not just a number out of thin air. There is
some basis for that. We have had, as the chart shows, sixty-seven
people released because they were innocent over these past twenty
years. We have had about 6000 people sentenced to death. So
without doing sophisticated math, it is about one percent. That is
about 1 in 100 of the people sentenced to death have been released,
a little over one percent.
Another basis for this 1 in 100 number is a Vanderbilt Law
Review study which found about one percent of murder convictions
in general are wrongful convictions. So let's take that as our basis.
It may be much larger. The problem is that only a few cases are so
thoroughly investigated that the prosecution drops the charge or a
new trial is given. So there may be many more than 1 in 100. Let's
assume it's 1 in 100. And, again, I think you have to look at that
number in comparison to something else to see whether that's
more of a significant number.
Let's assume, for example, there was a car manufacturer.
And that 1 out of 100 cars this manufacturer produced caused a
fatal collision. The car itself was so defective that it resulted in a
death 1 out of 100 times. Of course, that car would be taken off the
market. We wouldn't allow that.
We're not talking about accidental deaths here. We're talking
about preventable deaths. The death penalty is a preventable kind
of death. Similarly, if there's a kind of food where 1 out of 100
times that you use this brand of tomato sauce it causes botulism
and kills, we would take that off the market. That's what the
death penalty is. I think there is an assumption that 1 out of 100
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may be okay. But I don't believe that's true in other areas. I think
that should be part of our weighing, our moral discussion. Certainly this should have been brought home in Illinois where there
have been so many recent cases of subsequent innocence. Some of
these cases this year included Verneal Jimerson, Dennis Williams,
Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez just in the past six
months. The wrong people could have been executed on death row
for many years. It hasn't stopped.
Illinois has gone ahead with more executions. And you would
think there would be some stopping, some moral judgment to say
wait a minute--our system for finding, convicting and sentencing
people to death is flawed to the extent that we have found all these
mistakes. Maybe we should stop and reevaluate. I don't put a lot
of blame on Illinois. I think Illinois deserves some credit for finding these cases, for admitting mistakes in some of these cases by
the state. And even that's not going on in some states. These cases
are simply never discovered. New evidence is not allowed to be introduced because twenty-one days have passed since the trial. So
it's not a problem unique to one state.
These cases, these sixty-seven cases, are spread around the
country. But I think it is one of the more glaring problems that we
have to look at when deciding the morality of the death penalty.
Another issue, which I don't have in graphical form, but I think
should weigh into our consideration, is the cost of all of this. We
have seen that it hasn't done a lot of good. We have seen the possibility that it's divisive with respect to race. We have seen a
strong possibility that innocent people are being sentenced to
death, and that innocent people may be executed.
What does all this cost us? That is sort of a crass question
when you look at the morality of an issue. But I think it's the same
kind of analysis when we look at welfare or other questions. When
we're trying to decide whether something is good or bad, we have
to say: how much does it cost? And not just "how much does it
cost," but, "what else could that money be used for?" A very careful
analysis of the cost of the death penalty was done at Duke University. Their conclusion was that the death penalty cost about
two million dollars per execution more than if a case was handled
as a typical murder case with a life sentence. About two million
dollars for an execution. There have been about 350 executions.
That's 700 million dollars. That could buy a lot more police officers
on the streets, a lot more educational programs.
It's not just a question of money. It's a question of what
would do society the most good. The last two charts I will just put
on very briefly. I am only going to hint at it because I don't have
any strong conclusions here. But it may be related to the issue of
cost. And this is a pattern which we noticed in a few of the key
death penalty states, Florida and Georgia. At one point they were
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the death penalty capitals of the country. And they had a lot of
executions. Now that has died down to one or two per year. This is
happening in a few states.
The next graphic shows it is also happening in Louisiana. At
one point they had eight executions in two months in Louisiana.
After considerable media focus, that rate dropped to the point of
barely one or two a year. I don't think this pattern is necessarily
going to continue. But, I think it raises the possibility that the
death penalty is so burdensome, so expensive, so divisive that at
times the public which supports it is still ambivalent about it and
still not ready to go forward.
The last example here is Texas. Their executions dropped
this year. All predictions are that this is very temporary. But
maybe we're seeing a drop even there. I will just leave that with
you as perhaps a reflection on the fact that the death penalty
doesn't have to be what it has been in the past. In some states, it
may be getting a second look. Thank you.
MR. LAND: The symposium schedule says that this afternoon
our panelists are supposed to deal with the death penalty from a
philosophical and theological perspective. I am assuming I'm one
of the theological perspectives. At least I am willing to operate
under that assumption. I am a theologian by professional training
and by interest and inclination.
I do want to emphasize at the outset a couple of things. First,
it is a theological perspective. I am a Southern Baptist. I am the
head of the Ethics Agency for Southern Baptists. For those of you
who may not know, Southern Baptists are the largest Protestant
denomination in the United States with about sixteen million
members in 40,000 congregations nationwide. I guess one way to
introduce us is to say that Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Newt Gingrich,
Strom Thurmond and Trent Lott are all Southern Baptists. Jessie
Helms and Jimmy Carter are as well. Now, that says two things
about us: number one, we're a rather diverse lot; and number two,
that we certainly are not marginalized in society since the President, Vice-President, the third person in line of succession, the
fourth person in line of succession and former presidents are all
Southern Baptists.
Southern Baptists are Protestants. We are overwhelmingly
evangelical Protestants. And my theological perspective on capital
punishment will be delivered consciously from that perspective.
Let me also say that I have been appalled by much of what I heard
this morning and some of what I heard this afternoon. What I
heard is giving quantitative weight to what I intuitively felt is the
case, that there is outrageous injustice related to capital punishment as it has been exercised in the United States. Injustice both
to people who are poor and people of color, as well as individuals
who are far more likely to be executed than people of wealth, peo-
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ple who are not minorities and people who aren't male.
There is also a capriciousness of it from state to state. I am
sad to say I was outraged by what Dr. Bessette had to say about
California. If you want to kill somebody, obviously you want to
leave Georgia and go to California to do it. You're much less likely
to have to pay a significant price for having taken another human
being's life. I am not here to defend or to answer the critics of
capital punishment as it is practiced in the United States today. I
am here to provide a theological perspective as to why many people in the Protestant evangelical community-and clearly I have
quantitative evidence for this, four out of five or better of people
who identify themselves as Southern Baptists-believe at least in
the attraction of a theoretical capital punishment being an option
for the civil magistrate. Most evangelical Protestants, certainly
most Southern Baptists, believe there is a role for retributive justice in society.
One of the responsibilities of the state, mandated by Scripture, is to punish those who do the wrong thing. Vengeance and
retribution are not identical. In classical Protestant theology, this
distinction has always been maintained. In the New Testament
when Jesus talked about not taking vengeance, he was talking
about personal ethics. When the Apostle Paul, in Romans chapter
13, is dealing with the duty of the civil magistrate in the New Testament covenant, the main reason for the civil magistrate is to
punish those who do evil and to reward those who do that which is
right.
That leads us to some key questions, it seems to me. The key
question that I want to raise this afternoon is: whose morality is
the basis for determining what is right and what is wrong? I think
a lot of the confusion that we face on this issue and a lot of other
issues in the United States and in society today, is that there is no
preponderant or even consensus answer to that question. There
have been at times in our past, but that is no longer the case.
Another key question is that once we determine whose morality is to be the basis for societal law, and once the civil magistrate
rewards those who do that which is perceived to be right and punish those who do that which is perceived to be wrong, how does one
know the punishment envisioned is fair for the crime? I believe,
and I am speaking now from the theological perspective of a
Southern Baptist, on behalf of the majority of Southern Baptists,
and the majority of evangelical Protestants, when I say that it
must be based upon Scripture. For it to be seen as fair and just, it
must be based upon our understanding of the Scripture. If we
cannot justify it from Scripture, then we cannot justify it. I am not
saying that should be your standard. I am not saying that should
be the nation's standard. I am saying for those of us who consciously claim the label of Southern Baptist or evangelical Protes-
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tant, that for us it must meet that standard for us to support it.
We believe, based primarily upon Genesis chapter 9 and Romans chapter 13, that capital punishment is an option that is and
should be available to the civil magistrate to punish those who
take the life of another human being. And this, in fact, is a testament to society's outrage at a person who would presume the prerogative to take another human being's life. In our opinion, one's
decision about the moral rectitude of capital punishment depends
on his or her understanding of the passage in Genesis and the passage in Romans:13.
I want to focus on Romans:13. The Genesis passage is a passage in which God declares that those that take human life, that
their lives will be forfeited. But the passage that is most determinative for Baptists and most determinative for most evangelical
Protestants, is a New Testament passage. It is Romans:13. First,
it states that all governments, even bad ones, are divinely ordained and all people must be subject to them. Those who disobey
the government ultimately disobey God's ordinance.
Verses three and four are seen by us to be critical. All assert
government as God's ministers or divinely authorized to reward
those who do good and to punish evil doers. Verse four states that
government is the minister of God and avenger of wrath. I understand that to mean if someone kills my family, I do not have the
right to exercise vengeance and take their life. I do have the right
to expect the state, if they are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, to cause their life to be forfeited for wantonly and premeditatedly taking the life of my family. Biblical commentators agree
that the word "sword" in verse four is a symbol of authority given
to government to execute criminal justice up to and including capital punishment at the time in which it was written within the Roman Empire.
Why use the word "sword?" There are other symbols for the
state that could have been used. But the Apostle Paul states that
government is divinely empowered to dispense retribution. And
for retributive justice, the punishment must equal the crime.
Whether one takes a human life or whether one acts in a way callously and with forethought that causes other people to lose their
lives, whether you take their lives or not.
I have in mind one of the people that hasn't been mentioned.
Richard Alan Davis has been mentioned. We heard John Wayne
Gacy mentioned. We heard Ted Bundy mentioned. We heard others mentioned. But I want to add the name Mr. Ames to the list.
Mr. Ames sold secrets of the United States to a foreign power. At
best we can tell between twenty-five and thirty people as a result
of his betrayal and his treason, were tortured and died violent
deaths in the countries in which they resided. I think that he
should be executed, not given life in prison without parole for such
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a heinous crime. This is probably why I have been rejected for
jury duty twice. Defense lawyers see me coming. The majority of
Southern Baptists, I would say a large majority of Southern Baptists and evangelical Protestants would argue that Romans:13 and
Genesis:9 not only permit, but mandate capital punishment as an
option that is available in cases where there has been a taking of
human life.
I venture now into the next part of my statement, going
where angels fear to tread, but no one has ever accused me of being an angel. There is a very strong bias against theological perspectives being given any weight in our civil society. And that has
worked its way into the judicial system. When writing the decision
for the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Companion and Dine v.
Washington, which overturned the state ban on euthanasia, Judge
Reinhardt stated, "people with strong moral or religious convictions," I assume he was talking about me as well as some others,
"are not free to force their views, their religious convictions or
their philosophy on all other members of a democratic society."
I am not sure what he means by force. If he means by force of
arms, I agree. If he means by something other than the legal and
judicial process by which we determine what is made into law and
what does not get made into law, I agree. But is he effectively
seeking to censor people such as myself who come to our decisions
based upon our understanding of the scripture from participation
in public policy? Is he saying that anyone who argues for transcendent values to be brought to bear on the nation's public policy
or whatever, capital punishment or otherwise, assisted suicide,
that somehow we are to be segregated from public policy and that
our opinion, which are the opinions of American citizens, will be
disqualified from participation in the process? That this is somehow abandonment of the American way? It reminds me of a comment made by Lord Melbourne to a parliament struggling to curtail the slave trade in the 18th century led by non-conformists,
"things have come to a pretty pass when religion is allowed to invade public life."
Well, I am glad that religion did invade public life, stopping
the slave trade. I am glad that the Baptist minister Martin Luther
King, Jr. stood up and brought his religious convictions to bear.
And we intend to continue bringing ours. And if we convince the
majority of citizens that we're right, whether they agree with the
reason why, we will continue to insist that as American citizens we
have a right to participate and have a voice and-dare we sayeven enact what we believe to be right and what we believe to be
wrong into law. If the Supreme Court agrees with Judge Reinhardt, then I will say to the judicial system: you need to get your
house in order because the patience of the American electorate is
not limitless and believes that abandonment and a conscious deci-
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sion to reject it would be a very dangerous thing for our society.
MR. LUND: Good afternoon. I don't know if it's because the
seventh game of the National League Championship Series is tonight or because of other allusions today. But I can't help thinking
of some baseball related points as I start my remarks today. The
first one is that I am getting pretty low in this line-up. It's been a
long time. You heard about eleven speakers. And that is a tremendous advantage.
MR. SARAT: What does that mean for me?
MR. LUND: When I finish my story, you will know. In baseball games, you know, eight or nine batters come, expectations are
very low. So, therefore, I hope I can meet them. And I think
probably your greatest expectation right now is that I get it done
in even less than fifteen minutes, even without knowing what I
might say. The second thing is I would just like to refer to Dr.
Berns' comments about some of the minor leaguers who are
against the death penalty. I just wanted to put Pope John Paul II
in there. Let me begin my prepared remarks. Since the reinstitution of the death penalty in the United States, the teachings of the
Roman Catholic Church has evolved to a position of firm opposition. The United States Catholic bishops first went on record
against the death penalty in 1974. Six years later, the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops adopted the position urging abolition. Over the next decade and a half, Roman Catholic bishops
throughout the United States became and continue to be consistent and outspoken foes of capital punishment. Their stance is reinforced by the publication, The Catechism of the Catholic Church,
in 1994, and in Pope John Paul II's encyclical letter, The Gospel of
Life, in 1995.
This position roots itself in fundamental Catholic teaching on
the dignity of the human person and on the essence of the Christian message. Pope John XXIII spelled out the teaching of the
dignity of the human person in his 1963 encyclical, Peace On
Earth. He wrote that the rights every person possesses are
"universal and inviolable, so that they cannot in any way be surrendered." And in the 1994 statement, Death is Not the Answer,
the Catholic bishops in New York State summarized the teachings
on human dignity. They wrote, "as teachers and pastors, we are
called to proclaim a set of moral principles known as Catholic social teaching. At the heart of this teaching is the knowledge that
the human person is central, the clearest reflection of God among
us. Every person possesses a basic dignity that comes from God,
not from any human quality or accomplishment, not from race or
gender or economic status. Human life is inherently precious."
They continue to say, "those who commit crimes do not give up
their human dignity, and those who administer justice must not
deny this God-given dignity."
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Echoing throughout the condemnations of capital punishment
is this acknowledgment of the sacredness of human life. It is this
teaching that has overridden previous acquiescence in the Catholic
Church to capital punishment. No longer would the "forfeiture
theory," in which one who takes a life would forfeit his own right to
life, have currency in the Catholic tradition.
The second major rationale for opposition is the death penalty's categorical incompatibility with essential Christian teachings. The Kansas bishops articulated this point in their 1994
statement in which they asked, "Can the death penalty be reconciled with the teachings and examples of Jesus Christ? He teaches
us that His Father's greatest gift to us is life and, next to life, is
love, mercy and forgiveness. The Creator gives to us this life.
Next to life is love, mercy and forgiveness."
"We believe firmly that the death penalty takes us down the
wrong road of life. It fuels vengeance, diverts from forgiveness
and greatly diminishes respect for all human life. At the same
time," they go on, "we affirm strongly that the life of every person,
and the breath of every person, regardless of status or the condition of that person, is in the hands of God."
Earlier this year the Catholic bishops of Illinois firmly amplified this basic conflict between Christian teaching and the death
penalty. In February of 1996 they wrote, "people legitimately desire justice. However, justice cannot be achieved through vengeance. Vengeance is never a worthy motive. Our Scriptures direct
us to a different ethic. The often-quoted proverb, they continue, 'an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,' is not a prescription for revenge
or a goad for further bloodshed, but a guideline to keep people
from going beyond the original offense and escalating the violence." Jesus further clarified this position when He insisted that,
rather than retaliate on any level, we should offer the other cheek
and extend our hand in blessing and healing.
There is a third plank in most of the bishops' statements opposing capital punishment, although I would say it's secondary in
importance to the first two that I mentioned. It concerns the people who are sentenced to death. William Rentschler said, "the
death penalty is reserved exclusively for society's little people, its
powerless." The bishops' statements inevitably point to the widely
disproportionate numbers of poor people and people of color filling
in the more than 3000 death row cells in our country. The evolution of this strong Catholic opposition to the death penalty has coincided with the pontificate of Pope John Paul II. He spoke out
with increasing clarity and conviction in opposition to capital
punishment. He has made numerous personal appeals for clemency on behalf of condemned felons, many times to governors of
states in our country. Most significantly, he issued an encyclical
letter, which was one of the Roman Catholic Church's most
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authoritative forms that articulated the evolution of teaching on
capital punishment. This 1995 encyclical is entitled Gospel of Life.
John Paul II states very clearly that the state has the responsibility to impose adequate punishment on criminals. The
purposes of such punishment are threefold, he says: to defend
public order; the protection of people's safety; and rehabilitation of
the offenders. John Paul II draws his conclusion on the death
penalty in this way: "It is clear that for the purposes to be
achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon. It ought not go to the extreme
of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity. In
other words, when it would not be possible to otherwise defend society."
Today, however, he adds, "as a result of steady improvement
in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if
not practically non-existent." With this teaching, John Paul II
clarified the Roman Catholic position on this issue. The evolution
has been underway for over three decades, since the Second Vatican Council. It has resulted in clear repudiation of the death
penalty. It is morally acceptable only when no other means would
defend society. While casuistry can attempt to expand this peephole of possibility for justifiable capital punishment, the meaning
is very clear.
The Pope's articulation of his teachings in the Gospel of Life
made plain that those who seek to defend this deplorable punishment on the basis of Catholic Church teachings have no ground
upon which to stand. The position of John Paul II and various
groups of Roman Catholics bishops roots itself in the principle of
moral theology. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that
this perspective does not have a practical application. The opposition to the death penalty contains a great deal of practical wisdom.
United States Court of Appeals Judge Richard L. Nygaard accents the bishops' view on the ineffectiveness of vengeance. He
wrote, in American Magazine, "by exacting revenge upon criminals, society drops to the social stratum of its dregs ...
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know, and have known for centuries, that civilization requires restraint and that open personal revenge is socially destructive...
Official revenge is no better, and the results are no less odious. By
using revenge, by catering to the passions of society, government
tells its citizens that vengeance is acceptable behavior-it is just
that you, the individual cannot exact it." Judge Nygaard's statements about the efficacy and the cultural and deleterious effects of
vengeance points to our law having given a prominent place to
something that the Illinois bishops declare is "never a worthy human motive."
To some extent, our culture accepts getting even as a justifiable motive in matters both trivial and profound. I would say to
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the extent religious traditions accept capital punishment today, it
is a capitulation to this culture. The Roman Catholic position is,
indeed, at odds with current U.S. laws as well as culture. The
temptation is to be acculturated, that is, to conform to the prevailing cultural values, and to baptize the practice of imposing the
death penalty. Proudly, I can say that the Roman Catholic teaching has moved steadily and purposefully in a direction that aligns
it with its firmest principles and highest virtues. To prevail, which
I do believe that abolitionist movement ultimately will do, our culture must be transformed. Roman Catholic teaching can be a major resource in this ongoing process.
MR. SARAT: I would like to give you the baseball metaphor,
but that has been taken from me. So let me use several metaphors. First, let me remind you of Admiral Stockdale, was that his
name? Ross Perot's vice presidential running mate, who said on
the occasion of the vice presidential debate in 1992, "Who am I and
why am I here?" If that doesn't do it for you, then let me conjure
for you the image of what it's like to be the seventh speaker, actually fourteenth speaker today, by reminding you of the image of
the sixth wife of Henry VIII on her wedding night. She was confident that someone would show up. She was just not sure how interested he would be. And I have that sense, although I am grateful that you all stayed.
I want to talk about a group that hasn't been much talked
about. And that is the victims and the families of the victims. I
want to talk about the desire of people like Mark Klaas, the father
of Polly Klaas, to participate in the process through which her killer was brought to justice. We were all appalled at the image of
Polly Klaas' killer making scurrilous accusations against her father. But the news media barely covered what Mark Klaas said
beforehand. Mark Klaas participated in a ritual which is constitutionally kosher.
Another reason why I'm here is because you heard from the
Protestants. You heard from the Catholics, with whom I think it
may be possible to build an alliance. And now, one Jewish professor from a small college in western Massachusetts. As near as I
can tell, none of our people are in Congress.
I am going to talk about revenge and retribution and the way
in which the participation of victims in capital sentencing scrambles these categories, the way in which it brings neither consolation to them nor justice to the legal system. Why not murder the
murderer? It would be justice. More to the point, it would be
automatic and identical. And it would alleviate us of the responsibility for a decision, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."
But why not rape the rapist or torture the torturer? In this
morning's presentation, you heard the comparison to rape used. I
find it difficult to listen to that. Politically it's effective for those of
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us with progressive political tendencies. After all, if we were to
deal seriously with rape, shouldn't we deal seriously with murder?
We don't rape the rapist or torture the torturer because we
wish, and it is always difficult, we wish to be different from them,
to retain our humanity and our decency and our dignity. It is not
about their decency and dignity. Not to allow them to make us instruments of the kind of evil that they have done. Now, in my own
western Massachusetts way, I believe that the central teaching of
the Supreme Court of the United States, a teaching which is not
yet abandoned, is that at the heart of the decision as to whether or
not someone is to be executed, is human judgment and responsibility. No positive law, and I say this with all due respect, no natural
law can remove our responsibility to judge.
Professor Berns, while disclaiming his legal credentials,
made, I thought, a brilliant, although very traditional, lawyer's argument with the citations of a string of strong authorities. I can't
add the Pope. He is not on my team. So let me add two others
who certainly don't belong in the company of either Professor
Berns or the Pope.
First, and unfortunately he was on my team, Michael Dukakis. You all remember that telling moment in the 1988 Presidential debate when the anchorman, Bernard Shaw, asked Michael Dukakis, "What would you do if Kitty Dukakis were raped
and murdered?" And all of us in Massachusetts at that moment
said: if ever Michael Dukakis had a chance to be elected president
of the United States--and, of course, he didn't-- what he would say
next would end it. And sure enough, Michael didn't disappoint us.
Do you remember his response?
His response was to deliver a lecture on drug education. So let
me conjure up Michael Dukakis' right response. It would have
been this: "Well, of course, if someone did that to my wife, I would
want to kill them with my own bare hands. I would want to cut
their head off and display it as if I was a character in Macbeth.
But the aspiration of political and legal leadership is to ensure
that my basest, though most understandable human instincts, are
never translated into public policy."
With that response, he would not have been elected president.
But he would have been more popular in my household. Well, I
gave you Dukakis. And he is not much help. As a lead into my
prepared remarks, I would like to give you someone who is really
big. And that is Clint Eastwood. If you're a serious student of
capital punishment and a serious person who wishes to engage in
the subject of vengeance and retribution, you must see the film,
Unforgiven. Clint Eastwood is a model for all of us. The older he
gets, the wiser he gets. The older he gets, the better his films.
So let me take you to the last scene in Unforgiven. Remember
the last scene in Unforgiven? Eastwood confronts the sheriff, Bill,
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who Eastwood brilliantly cast as the former Eastwood. Remember
Dirty Harry? Bill, in the film Unforgiven, plays Dirty Harry, the
rogue cop. He confronts Bill, the rogue cop, the Dirty Harry of
sheriffs, who put to death Ned.
Now, you might ask why did Ned have to die? Well, if you all
read Tison v. Arizona, well, I believe in close reading of film, then
you know that Ned had demonstrated reckless disregard. Though
he hadn't actually killed, he demonstrated reckless disregard. So
Bill had the authority of the Supreme Court behind him. He didn't
know it when he killed Ned.
In that confrontation, when Eastwood is about to shoot Bill,
Bill says, "I don't deserve to die! I don't deserve to die!" Eastwood
responds that "deserving" has got nothing to do with it. Now, we
have been over this false choice. It's a false choice. Let me say that
again. It's a false choice.
The false choice is either the world of the profound moralism
of Macbeth or the existentialism of Camus. You put that choice to
the American people. And most American people would say,
"Who?" My challenge to those who are interested in public opinion
on this issue is to frame the question for the citizens of California
in the following way: "If you believe that there was significant
chance that people who were factually innocent of crimes of which
they're accused would be executed, would you be in favor of the
death penalty?" My suspicion, my hope, is that even in California
people would say no. Until that question is asked, until the question is asked, "Would you be in favor of the death penalty if you
knew that the victims of the crime, that the race of the victims of
crime is the best predictor of whether you get the death penalty?"
then I don't think any of us should be listening to anything about
public opinion. That's what I didn't have to say.
Now let me say what I came here to say. I am concerned with
something called victim impact statements. I am concerned with
them because I am concerned with the distinction between revenge
and retribution. You see, I am a legal conservative. Harry Blackmun had it right. It took him a long time to get it right, but Harry
Blackmun had it right.
Harry Blackmun said if you love the American legal system,
you must hate capital punishment. Notice, Harry, who had whined
for poor Joshua in Deshaney v. Winnebago, did not whine for the
victims of capital punishment. He mourned for capital punishment. In the United States and Europe, a high tide of resentment
is rising against the system of public justice. Victims are demanding that their voices be heard. In place after place, the demands
have been met. In Payne, as you know, the United States Supreme Court approved statements by survivors concerning emotional trauma and personal distress caused by the loss of a loved
one.
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MR. BESCHLE: It's time for questions. If you were here in
the morning session, you know that we have these handy microphones conveniently arranged. So if you would like, go to the microphone to ask your question. Perhaps, as a courtesy to the
panel, I should ask if any of them have questions for each other, to
get us going while people think and make their way to the microphone.
MR. BERNS: As a matter of fact, I have one for James Lund.
Does the Pope say that the Commandment is: "Thou shall not
kill?"
MR. SARAT: Don't answer that question. Are there any lawyers present in the room?
MR. LUND: I take my counsel's advice.
MR. BERNS: The Commandment is: "Thou shall not murder
or commit murder." There is a difference.
MR. LUND: I guess it depends on your translation.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question for Reverend Land.
My Biblical references aren't going to be complete, but how do you
square your position on capital punishment with a couple things
that Jesus said in the New Testament? The first is when He said
about stoning the adulterer, "Let those among us who are without
sin cast the first stone," which I interpret to be an anti-capital
punishment position. Secondly, when He discussed in the Old Testament "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," He replaced
that with a new law, which is "turn the other cheek" type thing,
which I also interpret as being, you know, non-judgmental and
anti-capital punishment.
MR. LAND: First of all, it doesn't really matter what I think.
I'll give you the Protestant orthodox response, which is mine. But
the fact is mine is pretty irrelevant. First of all, she was an adulteress. They weren't too serious about bringing adulterers to justice, unfortunately, in the first century. The classic understandings of that is the commentary that you can go read from Luther,
Calvin, right on up to the present is that they are violating the
Levitical Law by mob violence. You apparently looked at the Levitical Law reason, and I went to Genesis. And Genesis predates
Levitical Law and supersedes Levitical Law, that there had to be
eyewitnesses to the adultery.
Jesus evidently was saying they weren't there. He said,
"Which of you, which of you is going to violate Levitical Law and
do this," would be my understanding of that. And when He talked
about rejecting the idea of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth," and this is very important for you to understand, as far as I
am concerned and as far as most evangelical Protestants are concerned, let me be very careful here because there may be Protestants who disagree with me. If I try to speak about Protestant
theology in the last decade of the 20th century, that might kind of
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nail me to the evangelical tree because Protestant theology is all
over the place with nearly as many opinions as there are Protestants. So I am talking about a specific segment, which is the only
way one can speak about artfully, which is mine. That when He
talks about mercy and "turning the other cheek" and rejecting
vengeance, He is talking about the fact that we do not have the
right to respond by taking peoples' lives when they have done injury to us or harm us.
As Martin Luther King put it, he said, "I myself am dubious
about whether or not I have the right to use lethal force to defend
myself. I am certain that I have an obligation to use lethal force to
defend you." There is that tension involved in terms of the use of
violence. The answer that I think Michael Dukakis should have
given was, of course, "I am a human being. And I would be outraged. My immediate response would be to try to kill this person
myself for doing this terrible thing to my wife. That's why I am
excluding myself from serving on the jury. That's why we have
government, to dispassionately attempt to determine what happened and why, and to have a jury of peers who are not subjective,
as I would be. A jury who could separate themselves from a family
member's killing." I think Jesus is saying that we have a responsibility not to exact vengeance. But we do have the right to expect
the state to punish those who do evil.
As an evangelical Protestant, I do not see one scintilla of difference in authority between the teaching of Jesus and the Gospel
and the writings of the Apostle Paul in Romans: 13 where he lays
out the New Testament standard for the reason that God ordained,
which is to punish those who do evil up to and including the use of
the sword and reward those that do right.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In terms of the argument that it's the
state's responsibility and it's the state exacting this punishment,
perhaps what you were talking about earlier. But the state is necessarily made up of people. And we have certainly learned that
human fallibility is present in everything we do. I mean, it seems
there is no way you can put it off on the state because the state is
made up of people and graphic stories of, you know ....
MR. LAND: Let me say to you I cannot sit on a jury in capital
cases. They probably won't let me in our system. Last Christmas
my wife gave me a copy of the Life magazine which was published
the week that I was born. It advertises these catalogues. And it
happened to be the first week in November of 1946. As I was
thumbing through this, I saw a double page picture of a list of pictures. And it just so happens that the list of pictures were the
Nazi war criminals who had been condemned and hung in Nuremberg. I long for a society that can still make that kind of justice
distinction. Surely if people ever deserved to die for their crimes,
it was those people. I am glad that the Orthodox jury and those
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who influence such things were able to convince the State of Israel
to execute.
MR. LUND: I would like to say a couple of things. One is that
my reading, Catholic reading, of Genesis:9 is different. It's not a
pretext, in our view, to justify capital punishment. But it's a sad
commentary and a reality as a result of human sin. We are called
on to respect human life first and foremost. And the other thing I
can say is the heinous incident of the Nazi crimes cannot be understated. It's dangerous to compare by any analogy. But I would
say that most major governments in the 20th century have got
pieces of a Holocaust that they have perpetrated themselves. So
many more could possibly be done in a civil way.
MR. SARAT: This is dangerous talk. And it's really important
to observe that it's talk and to notice the examples that are used. I
must say that if you don't work with college sophomores, they
don't. The sophomores pick up very quickly that every example
has a child killer or a Nazi in it. Now, I'm sure this is true for all
you, it certainly is true for me, that part of participating in these
events, is that they are ritual events. And I give great credit to
John Marshall for bringing together the north pole and the south
pole. But it's really important to notice the language and the examples that you've offered.
The Nazis. What do you do about the Nazis? And then to
suggest that you can move easily from a society that can distinguish the Nazis from Jefferson. Right? That's the example that
we were offered earlier. If you don't execute the Nazi, then you
cannot make a rational distinction between a Nazi and a hero. I
think that's not an accurate argument. Now, I also don't think it is
helpful in the debate of capital punishment in the United States to
say, well, I want to live in a society that could execute the Nazi. I
want to live in a society that can prevent the mentality of the Nazi.
I want to live in a society that teaches the lesson that evil-doers
should not have power over all of us by compelling us to do to them
what they have done to us.
So my question is: would the appropriate punishment for
Hitler or Eichmann not to have been executed, but actually to have
been tortured, to have been gassed? I think the answer to that
question is no. Why? Because decent people don't do indecent
things. So the Nazi trump card is rhetorically designed to get us
into a debate in which the progressives are alive with people who
are sympathetic to the Nazis. I refuse to participate in that conversation.
MR. LAND: That's outrageous. That's outrageous.
MR. SARAT: Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What I find astonishing is that really
I don't find you all that far apart. I think what is being acknowledged here is that we are learning something about capital pun-

1997]

A Philosophicaland Theological Perspective

ishment. We are learning something about victimhood. We are
learning something about perpetratorhood. And I remember the
Catholic Church's position that was very akin to "an eye for an
eye." What I am wondering is, whether or not we're getting
someplace here.
The other thing that is very fascinating is that all the countries in Europe without a single exception, all of them went
through the Holocaust, all of them went through horrors of civil
war in which the death penalty was used as a political tool. And
none of them had the death penalty. If the last exercise of the
death penalty was the killing of the Nazis, there is something that
happened with that execution that ultimately ended executions.
And I don't know why that was. And that's what I was wondering,
if perhaps that could be something that is coming out of this. They
were killed.
There was a story in yesterday's Sun Times about a man who
literally tossed them off. They were all hanging. And I wonder
whether or not there was something that, when that happened,
something that said we acted like they were such that it ended.
Something that actually ended. All European countries ended the
death penalty shortly afterwards.
MR. LAND: Well, my response to that would be that's not the
case. My understanding of that history, and I will stand corrected
by those who perhaps know it better, is that it was the American
government that was insistent upon both the Nuremberg trials
and the trials of Japanese war criminals. And, of course, our opinion about capital punishment was, as you can still see here today,
somewhat ambivalent.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I do know about the Nuremberg trial.
And you're absolutely correct. There were four parties: England,
France, Russia and the United States. The problem is that only
England and the United States had "innocent until proven guilty."
Russia and France had "guilty until proven innocent." They
couldn't get that going. Next it was discovered that England said:
"We really don't care. Frankly, we just want to kill them. We
won." And it was discovered that Russia was doing everything
that they were accusing the Germans of doing. So ultimately
America did take on that goal. And yes, it remained a completely
American process except in the minor trials which then involved
the other states. There is something that happened effectively after that war and after those deaths that permanently stopped the
death penalty in most European countries and in a very short order. I was wondering how that happened, why that happened. And
I wonder whether or not it had something to do with acknowledging, perhaps, that we had become like them. And perhaps we discovered that now in Israel too.
MR. BERNS: May I introduce something here? You're quite
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right. Everything you mentioned is quite right with other countries and particularly European countries that have abolished the
death penalty. There was specific reference made earlier to the
fact that Croatia has abolished the death penalty. Do you think
Croatia is a model for us? They may not execute. But they send
their army in and kill, kill, kill. So Croatia is a model for us? Now,
as to this Nazi business that so offends Professor Sarat ....
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And the rest of us.
MR. BERNS: All right. You all applauded his remarks, or
most of you did. In the preface to my book For Capital Punishment, I mention the fact that I was not involved in this question of
capital punishment and got involved in it only because of the Supreme Court. And I was teaching constitutional law. And I didn't
know what my position on it would be. But my position hardened
almost simultaneously when I encountered the example of this
person who directly after World War II began and continued
throughout his life the task of hunting down these Nazis who escaped into the world at the end of World War II.
I found myself admiring that singular activity. How could a
man devote his entire time to hunting down the likes of Adolph
Eichmann, these monsters who had done what they did? I won't
risk offending the sensitivities of Professor Sarat getting into the
question of what they did. But here is a person who devoted his
life to it. And I found myself admiring that person. And I suspect
that most of us admire that person for what he was doing. Why
was he doing it? To bring these people to justice. I raised the
question for myself. When we catch them, what are we going to do
to them? What would be the appropriate punishment for them?
If we go into the criminology books and look at the question of
punishments and its purpose, it is deterrence. Do we punish Adolph Eichmann in the hope that we might deter others? For example, those Serbs today and those Croats today or those Palestinians today. Surely, that's altogether vain, isn't it? There is no
prospect whatever that we're going to deter these others by executing or punishing in some other fashion Adolph Eichmann. Now,
what about rehabilitation? The criminology texts are filled with
talk about rehabilitation, rehabilitate the criminals. Would anybody in his right mind think that you're going to rehabilitate Adolph Eichmann? Why then do we bring or why do we think it's
right to bring the likes of Adolph Eichmann to justice? To punish
him. Why? To pay his debt under the due process of law, not by
torture, of course.
I take offense as much as Mr. Land would. But under the due
process of law. And I think I am right in saying that Adolph
Eichmann is the only man they have executed, to pay him back.
What else would you do?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just want to make this comment. I
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am a black Catholic law professor abolitionist, who also is a survivor. My sister was murdered. My roots are California. I lived
there a long time. I am presently living in Kentucky. So I'm kind
of a little bit of everything. I am really kind of offended by Dr.
Berns. Maybe I am not hearing correctly. But Dr. Berns' and Dr.
Land's suggestions that I am not admirable and that also because
abolitionists oppose the death penalty, therefore, we don't feel for
Polly Klaas. I feel for my sister who was murdered. I never once
wanted the death penalty for her murderer. And your suggestion
that I am not seeking justice done, therefore, I am not admirable.
No to punishment, yes to maybe life without parole. But to kill her
murderer, I don't see what it accomplishes. I don't see that that
makes a grandiose notion of justice. And I really resent the notion.
Richard Davis is a very severely disturbed man. I abhor what
he did to Polly Klaas. I would not want to see that done to anybody. I didn't like seeing my sister murdered. But I would not
want that person executed. Richard Davis, life without parole. He
is a danger and should never have been let out of prison in the
first place. But that is here and done. And the thing with Dr.
Land saying something about capital punishment and The Bible. I
understand it's a Southern Baptist position because the scripture
allows it, therefore, the state should have it. And it should be
there. And this notion that maybe there is something immoral or
amoral about me because I just don't believe in it and I don't want
it.
I was ready to go testify on his behalf for sentencing. And that
kind of leads me to your talking about victim impact statements. I
know that prosecutors do not want this. They do not want the victim's family members getting up there and saying please do not
give this person the death penalty, life without parole, life and
forty, life and ten. I don't care. But don't give him the death penalty. The prosecutor in my sister's case wouldn't indict, which goes
back to Richard Dieter's point about the race. The murderer was
white. She was black. She was drowned in mud. The prosecutor
refused to indict because my position was no death penalty. He
also said, "Well, I am not going to get a conviction anyway because
she is black." I have a lot of statements out there.
MR. LAND: First, let me express my condolences to you for
your loss.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am not concerned ....
MR. LAND: Let me say, first of all, in response to your question about the Southern Baptist position, you shouldn't have to accept capital punishment unless the majority of America decides
that way and unless the courts decide that way. That's how we
decide things in the United States. You and I have a profound
disagreement philosophically. As to the question of not being admirable, I certainly have not said that. In fact, I would not have
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said that during the course of this entire day. One of most insufferable things that I have had to endure, as Dr. Berns has had to
endure, is the assumption of the mantle of moral superiority of
those who oppose my position. I mean it oozes from every pore. I
am used to it. I'm not really offended by it. But it is insufferable.
It is the people who are against capital punishment under any
circumstance, under any circumstances that are assuming moral
superiority. As far as I am concerned, what happened in Nuremberg was not vengeance. And we didn't do to them what they did
to us.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am talking about my sister, an average, normal murder in the United States, not genocide. And
people accuse me. They say, Roberta, you're taking a position of
superiority, moral superiority because you are against capital
punishment and your sister was murdered. So you think you're
better than everybody. Maybe I do. What is wrong with that?
MR. LAND: I just think I have a position ....
AUDIENCE MEMBER: People like you, I am saying, people
like you use that argument.
MR. LAND: Which argument?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That we think we're superior in some
way.
MR. LAND: I think any panel of objective observers that
watch this today would come to the same assumption.
MR. BERNS: May I respond. I think you heard me say things
that I didn't say. I certainly did not mean to imply that anyone like
you who holds your position is not to be admired or is not admirable. My concern is that the United States is made up of citizens
who are angry at crime. And one knows that one can express anger in various ways. I assume that with the murder of your sister,
you think that he or she should be punished in some way.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I already said that.
MR. BERNS: And the basis of that judgment is, I think, your
anger and your grief. But your anger, too, at this person. And I
repeat. I did not say what you heard.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I also said I am Catholic. And I am
not a good Catholic anymore. But I am stuck with that. I believe
in forgiveness. And I have forgiven this person. That doesn't mean
I don't want to punch him. Those are two very separate issues.
MR. LAND: Then we agree.
MR. BERNS: In my remarks earlier, I referred to Abraham
Lincoln. And I said he executed or allowed the execution of 257
persons. And I said he did with whatever reluctance. And one can
understand the reluctance of something. Lincoln said one time
when he had a petition in front of him, a death warrant to sign, he
said you can't understand how hard it is for me to allow someone
to die when I know at the stroke of my pen I can save him. I can
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appreciate that. I am sure, knowing myself, that I would feel the
same sort of thing if I was in his position. One reason I don't run
for public office, I suppose, is I don't want that position.
MS. BOTHNE: We have ten minutes left and two or three
people who want to offer questions. Perhaps we as panelists can
limit our comments. Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm not sure this question is appropriate. But let me address Professor Sarat. You talked about victim impact statements as though that might be a factor in your
mind in determining whether or not capital punishment is acceptable or not. How the victim felt before they made their statement
then after the execution, that is one question. And the follow-up
would be if there was a substantial difference, if the people felt
better, thought there was closure, would that change anybody's
mind relative to whether or not capital punishment is valid?
Then if I can follow-up with Mr. Lund, he seems to be an
authority on Catholic bishops. I there believe this is the same
group of Catholic bishops who came out, as Pope John Paul did,
against birth control. About ninety-two percent of Catholics don't
pay attention to that. And they also came out against abortion.
And most people do not follow that. So why that citation of
authority?
MR. LUND: You put the thing out there. I believe it's true.
And if you believe it's true, you work on them. If you don't believe
they're true ....
MR. SARAT: The question isn't the victim impact statements.
For me it's an important indication of the idea that retribution
plays in that capital punishment system. So I don't know the answer to the first question about what would the empirical data
show about healing, consolation, relief. And over what period of
time we would want to have looked at. I just don't know.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would like to ask a question to Dr.
Land and Dr. Berns, if I may. I heard from both of you on various
points. And there were certain comments where you wanted abolitionists to be cognizant of the long-term effect of their positions for
making decisions down the road. Well, I certainly agree with Professor Sarat. Hopefully we can prevent that necessity. But I haven't heard either one of you address the responsibility that you
can't really get out of speaking for capital punishment in this
country. Once you're handed the statistics that over a period of
about twenty years, it has stayed stable, if I understand the statistics correctly, that the chance of being put to death is multiplied
in the United States four times if you kill a white rather than a
person of color. Now, what I would like you to say clearly to yourselves and, therefore, to us, is how can you-especially Dr. Land, a
theologian-justify not taking responsibility for the outcomes of
your position, knowing that the real choice in the United States-
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even Justice Blackmun, who I also think is quite right, finally
came to, and very reluctantly on his part-might be all right in
theory to have a death penalty, but we can't seem to fix the way
we're doing it. And, therefore, we'd better stop.
MR. LAND: Let me answer first, mine is shorter than Dr.
Berns. I do accept responsibility for racism in the United States as
an American, as a white American. And I am the person who led
the campaign for Southern Baptists to apologize for slavery and to
apology for racism and to ask for forgiveness of the African-Americans and to seek reconciliation. Doing away with capital
punishment, how is that going to end racism? It's whites reaching
out and transforming other whites.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Excuse me, Dr. Land. You're talking
around my question.
MR. LAND: I am trying to answer your question. This is the
United States. Unless I'm on a stand, I get to answer the question
the way I want to answer it. And I also said at the outset of my
remarks, you can check the recorder, that I was not defending
capital punishment as it is practiced in the United States. I was
asked to give a theological perspective on the question of capital
punishment. And from my theological perspective, it is an option
open to the civil magistrate. And I have said publicly on prior occasions, and I will say it here, if we are going to advocate the use of
capital punishment when a murder has taken place, then we must
be as committed to an equitable and just application as we are to
its application. In my own head and my own mind and my own career, that is true. I can only take responsibility for my career, my
heart and my efforts.
MR. BERNS: My answer to that question is very simple. At
the end of my book, it's possibly the last chapter, I am on record
saying that if we cannot administer the death penalty in fair
fashion, it should be abolished.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Isn't twenty years enough of a proof
that it can't?
MR. BERNS: I am sorry. I didn't hear.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The question is now it's been twenty
years we've been trying. And as we say, we cannot do this. Everything we've done for twenty years, the Supreme Court has supposedly tried to make it equitable. And you end up with Justice
Blackmun coming out with, "I have tried for twenty years." You
cannot make this work equitably. Therefore, we must stop doing it.
Twenty years is enough.
MR. BERNS: That's a position that I can respect. Before
passing judgment on it myself, I will look in greater detail at what
it is, in fact, how it's been administered. I am not persuaded by
some of the statements made from the panel here. For example,
there have been studies by the Rand Corporation that undermine

1997]

A Philosophicaland Theological Perspective

some of the statements made here about the races involved in the
administration of the death penalty. But I repeat, I said it in my
book and I mean it, we cannot do this. It's not a question of cruel
and unusual punishment. It's a question of equal protection of the
laws.
MR. BESCHLE: Last question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wait a minute. I just want to make
sure. I come from a traditional mainline Protestant tradition
where we just recently, along with about seventy-five percent of all
Christians, Protestant Christians in the United States, put together a statement against the death penalty. And I want to be
very clear about something before I go back to work and before I
continue this work so I have a better understanding. The civil
authority that you claim Christians are to give deference to, would
you not agree, sir, that the civil authority of the German government was the same civil authority that killed its own citizens and
killed so many people around the world? Would you not agree that
was civil authority, sir?
MR. LAND: Sure. I would. And I would respond by saying
that the Christians should do what the Confessing Church did.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Bowers, I have worked with
jurors over the last several years. I sat in courtrooms where the
judge will begin the colloquy with the jurors saying how many here
are opposed to the death penalty, how many are in support. But
opposed to the death penalty, and on the average there are about
thirty, forty jurors, every single time, whoever raises their hand,
the judge will very politely and very judicially say, "Thank you,
have a good day." These people are dismissed from that jury room,
from that courthouse and into the street as if they had done something wrong. I want to know what kind of theological or psychological study of jurors have been conducted in a country who has
decided that they should impose the death penalty? We know there
are going to be victims who continue to suffer even after their
loved ones have been executed. But what is happening to the jurors in this country? What is happening to the judges in this country and the people in the streets as we continue to execute people?
Finally, as a theologian, I can tell you according to Scripture,
I want to be very careful around that little phrase "an eye for an
eye" or "a life for a life." Because if you notice, we don't put a verb
in front of that little phrase. And we don't do that for a very good
reason. The verb is not take. If you read The Bible, you will see
that the word is "give": "give an eye for an eye," "give a life for a
life." It is very clear that the death penalty was only to be used in
most rare and most extreme circumstances and not as a matter of
course, especially against the poor.
MR. BOWERS: Our interviews with capital jurors contain a
wealth of answers. But they are yet to be fully examined. I can
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say a couple of things, though, in response to your question.
Your question about what happens when the judge dismisses
people who say "yes, I am opposed to the death penalty" in the
presence of other prospective jurors is a good one. There is research showing that this experience of seeing other jurors dismissed for being opposed to the death penalty at the very beginning stage of the trial makes the remaining jurors more likely to
think that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment in the
case they are going to hear.
In this connection, when we asked jurors "Do you think that
the death penalty is required under the laws of [your] state if the
defendant is proven to be a danger to society, or if the crime is heinous, atrocious, or depraved?" Under each of these circumstances,
thirty to forty percent of the jurors say that they believe the law
requires the death penalty. Well, one of the things we know from
this morning's session is that the Supreme Court absolutely forbade the mandatory imposition of the death penalty at the time of
the Gregg decision in its Woodson and Roberts rulings. The Court
held that under no circumstances could the law require the death
penalty to be imposed automatically, without the consideration of
mitigating factors because so doing would violate the constitutional requirement of individualized treatment in capital sentencing. Many capital jurors obviously fail to learn this fundamental
constitutional principle along the way. There will be much more to
say on this and related matters of juror decision-making as our
work proceeds.
MR. BESCHLE: Unfortunately, we have really got to stop.
You can continue this, however, informally with your favorite or
least favorite panelist at the reception.

